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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A,

Questions Presented and Standard of Review

Appellee/Cross Appellant ("Appellee/Cross Appellant" or "Buck") takes
exception to Appellant/Cross Appellee's ("Cindy") presentation of the issues and
corresponding standards of review.
"In order to establish that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, ;[a]n
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate
that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence.' If the evidence is inadequately marshaled,
this court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1fl9, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184. As to mixed questions of law and
fact:
Even where the [appellants] purport to challenge only the legal ruling, ...
if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal
standard is extremely fact sensitive, the [appellants] also have a duty to
marshal the evidence." Id
Cindy's statement of the standards for review for Issues 2-4 is incorrect, as it
erroneously characterizes the questions on appeal as strictly legal questions when in
reality they are a review of the trial court's findings of fact. (See Appellant's/Crossl

Appellee's Brief "Brief" at 2-3.) As Cindy has failed to marshal the evidence, the
Court should assume that by Cindy's failure, all findings of fact (including mixed
findings of fact and law) are adequately supported by the evidence.
B.

Issues on Appeal
1.

The district court's orders with respect to Cindy's issues should be

affirmed because Cindy has not marshaled the evidence as required to challenge
the trial court's findings of fact.
2.

The district court's orders with respect to the issues raised in

Cindy's appeal should be affirmed, because as a matter of fact and law, Cindy is
not entitled to the relief as requested.
C.

Standards of Review

New issues on appeal: Claims not raised in the district court may not be raised
for the first time on appeal. Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, t 26, 158 P.3d 540 (Utah
2007). A party must give the district court an opportunity to address the purported
error or is precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, f
15, 127 P.3d 1256 (Utah 2007).
District Court's Findings: A trial court's factual findings will not be disturbed
unless they are shown by marshaling to be clearly erroneous. U.R.C.P. 52(a);
Bluffdale Mt. Homes, LC v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, 1 46, 582 Utah Adv. Rep.
41. The application of law to facts found at trial is a mixed question of fact and law.

Wayment v. Howard, 2007 UT 56, J 9, 144 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2007). This Court defers
to the district court's application of law to the facts, granting broad deference when the
issue is extremely fact dependent. Id. "In addition, when appealing a highly fact
dependent issue, the appellant has a duty to marshal the evidence." Id. The law
applied is reviewed for correctness. Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 1 11, 154 P.3d 808
(Utah 2007).
D.

Issue Preservation

Appellee/Cross-Appellant asserts that Cindy has not properly preserved her
Issues for appellate review. This Court's rules require an appellant to demonstrate that
issues raised on appeal were properly raised and preserved in the district court.
U.R.A.P 24(a)(5)(A), (B). Cindy has failed to comply with this Rule. Further,
because Cindy raises new issues for the first time on appeal, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
had no opportunity to address such issues below.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations
whose interpretation is determinative, or of central importance, to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below

The parties were married in August 1974 and separated in approximately April
2003. (R. at 2950). On June 13, 2003, Buck filed a Petition for Divorce against Cindy
3
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Property Distribution
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ihe case, i..
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the trial court heard oral argument on the trial. (R. at 2830.) On June 16, 2006, Judge
Schofield issued a Ruling on the trial and on July 27, 2006 the trial court entered the
final Amended Decree of Divorce. (R. at 3007.)
a.

KBR Systems, Inc. ("KBR")

At trial, Buck asked the trial court to fix the value of his interest in KBR based
on the stockholders equity/book value with discounts for lack of marketability and lack
of control. (R. at 2840, 20-28.) Buck's expert business evaluator, Mr. Townsend,
testified that he relied on studies and literature to calculate a 27% discounted value.
(R. at 2840, 25:3-13.) However, the trial court dismissed Mr. Townsend's testimony
and held that Mr. Townsend seemingly appeared to pick the discounts out of the air
without resort to any objective criteria. (R. at 2948-2947.) Yet, subsequently, the trial
court held that a fair valuation of Buck's interest in KBR would be two-thirds of the
way between Mr. Townsend's discounted value and book value, without explanation as
to why the two-thirds point was a more appropriate discounted value. (R. at 2946.)
b.

Appreciated Value of the Marital Home

At the time the parties divorced in 2003, they owned a home in Lehi, Utah
valued at $550,000. (R. at 2945.) The trial court awarded Cindy this marital home,
plus any appreciation since September 2003. (R. at 2945.) Since the time of
separation, Buck paid the mortgage and marital home expenses. (R. at 2945, 2933,
2937-2936.) However, the trial court did not make a finding as to the value of that
5
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' c.

Interest on BASCO Award

In the final Amended Decree of Divorce, Cindy was awarded Buck's entire
business interest in BASCO, IA C ("BASCO") as of September 2003. (R. at 3003.)
The trial court •* Kuuii^ - ^ . . . . . . ;;*,k: ^ c m e u interest ac- p;

•. : , :.',:-.

... .1.

lid i llnwevi i ,n ,i pus! ind^iiiiMil IIIMIIM1.' nn ,1 Mnli ii III (, mash SubpociM ' ) ' ; Tecum for Steven Cardin, the trial court interpreted its ruling to include interest to be
paid to Cindy on the BASCO principal pursuant io TT C.A § \ v ! • 1 r7 scq. dating from
the time of the entry of the divorce decree. (R. at 2.s. i

o j-;.

^ issue of ••'

interest was not raised at dial, lml »\.r. iahed I'oi llie 1ml linn l>\ (In i un I duiin i (In
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B.

Statement of Facts
1.

Facts Regarding Alimony
a.

Cohabitation Hearing

Oi i Octobei 11 ai 1 :! 1 2, 2005, ai I evidei ltiai y 1 learii lg v > as 1 leld oi I Bi lck's reqi lest
to terminate alina>n\ based on Cindy's suspected cohabitation with M r . Bradbury. (R.
at 2841-2842.,

*:> • KM-, h ?2, 2006, the trial court denied Buck's request (R. at 2798)

based on the following findings:
M; riiadbury was allowed access to L,IUU\ - u . loencc • a;> .o .i s. • •: r.
il> - ^ 0 ? 2796); (R at 2842, 25f> 2 ^ >"
6

•

Although Mr. Bradbury knew where a hidden key was located, this is not
the same thing as possessing a key and there was no evidence that Mr.
Bradbury ever used the hidden key to gain access to the residence. (R. at
2796); (R. at 2842, 256.)

•

There is no compelling evidence that Mr. Bradbury spent all or even most
of his time at Cindy's residence. (R. at 2796); (R. at 2842, 258.)

•

Mr. Bradbury did have some shirts in Cindy's closet. There was no
evidence that Mr. Bradbury had other clothing or toiletries there. (R. at
2796); (R. at 2842, 258.)

•

A private investigator and other witnesses noted the presence of Mr.
Bradbury's vehicle at Cindy's residence from time to time, but the
number of times noted indicate that Mr. Bradbury was not doing anything
more than visiting. (R. at 2796-2795.); (R. at 2842, 259.)

•

There is insufficient evidence that Mr. Bradbury paid any of Cindy's
living expenses. (R. at 2795.); (R. at 2842, 259.)

•

There is insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Bradbury and Cindy
were living as husband and wife. (R. at 2795.); (R. at 2842, 260.)

However, the trial court also made a number of findings that would support a
finding that Cindy and Mr. Bradbury were in fact cohabitating:
•

Cindy has maintained a sexual relationship with Mr. Bradbury. (R. at
2797.); (R. at 2842, 256.)

•

Mr. Bradbury admitted to living at Cindy's residence by enrolling his
daughter in school and filling out an admission form in which he stated he
was living with friends or relatives at the address of Cindy. (R. at 2795.)

•

When Cindy testified that "we didn't put a new [dishwasher] in", she was
referring to Mr. Bradbury and herself. (R. at 2795.); (R. at 2842, 261.)
This reference indicates "there was more going on here than may meet the
eye." (R. at 2842, 261.)
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Mr. Budbury's credit card purchase activity in ulah Cuaniy increased
significantly after he began associating with Cindy. This spending pattern
would be consistent with someone who is living in Utah County, hi. by
itself it does not rise to the level of establishing the requirements
necessary under Utah case law to conclude th.it Vis. Robinson ain; Mr
Bradbury were sharing a common residence, (k at 2795-2794,»; K. at
2842,261.)
Judge Schofield noted that although M

Bradbury clearly admitted ih;-.; h... was

living with Cindy, he was "not sure what to make oi :au ;....\
-, i'1.1'-

the other critical indicia oi n^m M^UH.:; .
case

.-

• .. . • :" , — - •
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b.

The Court's Calculation of Alimony

The trial court determined that a 'fair and equitable rate of alirriom »^; ». c
$4,000

(R. 2916.) To reach this award m; ir„:, ., ..t . .

.-

factors, which ihe tnal coin MI< liidi d in H". l-dilino ,^ Hndinj's of fact:
.

Buck has the capacity of earning $150,000 per year. (R. at 2934: The
trial court came to this amount by considering Buck's income for 2002,
2003, and 2004, three of die (our yeai> at isar R at 2934-2933 The
trial court did not consider !>uck\s income from 2005. since there was no
evidence presented to the couri thai the "usually large" income for that
year "will be repeated and a significant portion of that income was
distributed so that Buck and his partner could retire some of their
indebtedness to KBR ." (R. at 2933/)

•

Since the parties separated, Buck's debt increased by more than $140,000.
This amount was not available for the payment of alimony, bin was used
?s
-\^' attorneys fees and fees for Cindy of over $170,000. T< at 2933,]
.may was able to meet most or all of her living expenses on the financial
assistance she received from Buck before the March 2006 trial, which was
$5,670 per month. {U <a 2932.)
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•

Buck has an ongoing capacity to earn $12,500 per month, and he has the
capability of paying alimony to Cindy from that income. (R. at 2916.)

•

The alimony award of $4,000 per month represents 32% of Buck's gross
income capacity. (R. at 2932.)

•

The alimony award of $4,000 per month will allow Cindy to meet her
obligations and will also allow her "to still have funds available to meet
her reasonable ongoing living expenses." (R. at 2932.)
2.

Facts Regarding Property Distribution

The trial court made an exhaustive and detailed accounting and analysis
regarding the parties' assets, interest therein, credits and debts, etc. in dividing the
marital estate. (R. 2950, 2919.)
a.

Discounted Value of KBR

Buck is a 50% shareholder of KBR, however, this stock is a marital asset. (R. at
2949.) There are two KBR shareholders - Buck and his business partner Steven
Cardin. (Id.) As of April 30, 2003 (the most recent accounting before the Divorce
Decree), KBR had an adjusted stockholder's equity of $1,287,516. (Id.)
Buck and Mr. Cardin agreed in a buy-sell agreement that in the event one of
them died, the other could buy out the deceased partner's estate by paying 125% of the
stockholder's equity. (R. at 2949.) They also agreed that in the event of an
involuntary dissolution of the company, the buy-out amount would be fixed at the
stockholder's equity without any premium or discount. (Id.) Although, the trial court
found that this divorce would constitute an involuntary transfer, it also recognized that
9
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personal guarantees of Buck and Mr. Cardin. (Id.). "Each of these factors has a direct
and significant impact on the true value of KBR. (R. at 2948.)
Buck's expert business evaluator, Mr. Townsend, applied a numerical
percentage discount to the value of Buck's interest in KBR for lack of control and lack
of marketability. (Id.) The aggregate discount amount Mr. Townsend imposed was a
discount of 27%. (IcL) Mr. Townsend concluded that the proper value of KBR, based
on book value and discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability, is $944,856.
(Id,)
Mr. Townsend testified that he reached his discounted values based on
"numerous studies . . . performed over the years by thinkers in business valuation that
quantify kind of the reasonable range of discounts for minority interests and for lack of
marketability." (R. at 2840, 25:4-7.) The studies show that "[minority shareholders
in closely held businesses . . . incur significant discounts typically." (R. at 2810,
25:12-13.) He further explained that:
[T]he studies and the literature show and the general practice in business
appraisal, is that these 50 percent interest don't suffer a complete minority
position with regard to discounts and they are a little bit easier to sell, so
they exercise some amount of control and some enhanced level of
marketability over a true minority interest, but it's not at the same level as
a controlling interest.
(R. at 2810, 26:22-27:5.) Thus, Mr. Townsend concluded that, "typically, appraisal
practice is to place the discount somewhere in between a control position and a minority
position." (R. at 2810, 27:6-8.)
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However, the trial court ultimately found thai Air. Townsend arrived at the
discount percentages himself (although using his best professional judgment) and that
Mr. Townsend "seemingly appears

IMU- \ r:t;.-:;; ! * >]'

* ^ :i

-.- >\wc "iiiiua; ne amounts ni : = ;j two iiscounts

die two discounts, but uaimed liiat "he aid not provide

any meaningful basis for his choice of the amounts of the two discounts. Indeed he
conceded that he himself selected the amounts of the two discounts." (R. at 2 9 " n )
Subsequent i\. ;>a.>a.; ,.i, ...
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ownseno :. .>>^h* ;i ; t ;.ii;..; :*• ,;i. S\GC reasons for

1 lis selectioi I of tl le ai I 101 u it s :)f discoi n its' \ tl le ti ial cc I n 11 efi ised to accept 1 lis
discounted amoui its "whole clothe". (R. at 2947.) Ii istead, tl le trial court found that
Mr. Townsend's proposed value represented the lowest possible figure that tl le coi n t
could use in fixing the value of the marital asset, while book value represented the
Inquest possible f igui e tl le coin t ecu lid i lse. (Tc 1.) ' 1 1 it: i I, tl le ti ial ecu ii t foi n id tl lat a fair
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valuation of KBR would be two-thirds of the way between Mr. Townsend's discounted
value and the book value, or $1,173,296. (R. at 2946.) The trial court failed to give
any basis for its selection of the two-thirds point, other than it chose to err in Cindy's
favor as to the discounted amount so that she would be divested of her KBR interest at a
fair value. (R. at 2947-2946.)
b.

Interest on BASCO Award

As of September 5, 2003, the net asset value of BASCO was $515,750. (R. at
2946.) Since Buck is 50% owner of BASCO, the net asset value of his one-half interest
was $257,875. (R. at 2945.) Buck's entire one-half interest in BASCO was awarded to
Cindy. (R. at 2945.)
The issue of interest on the BASCO principal was not included in the divorce
decree. The trial court had awarded Buck's interest in BASCO to Cindy, finding that
"[i]f either Mr. Cardin or Buck wish a different result, they will have to find a
mechanism to buy out Cindy's interest in BASCO." (R. at 2922.)
However, in a post-judgment bench hearing, the trial court interpreted its ruling
and awarded interest on the BASCO principal that has accrued since September 2003,
to be paid by Buck to Cindy pursuant to section 15-1-1 et seq. of the Utah Code
Annotated. (R. at 2841, 15-20.) The trial court explained that if Buck and Mr. Cardin
did not like the result of the court's ruling as detailed above, they would need to buy
out Cindy for the amount of $257,875, or half the amount of BASCO as of the
13
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Facts Regarding Court's Denial of Attorney Fees.

' The trial court specifically denied an award of attorney's fees based oi i its
finding that both pailirs pic\ ailed on wnnv Ihur issue1. «il lii.il ind neilliei |iail\ Mil]
affor d to pay tl le attoi ney's fees of tl le other. (R. 2929.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, Cindy did not properly preserve the issue ^i ..u! - MI ni.t--. .a \iw :,;...
level, so she cat n tc )l i aise it i 10 v i lpoi i appe al
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Even if Cii idj ' 1 lad pi eserved tl le issi le of

bias at the trial court level, the allegations raised in Cindy's brief do not rise to the
level of prejudice needed to establish judicial bias under Utah law. Additionally,
Cindy's argument that the trial court should have allowed her to present fault evidence
must also fail. The issue of fault was not before the trial court; therefore, the trial
court properly disallowed the introduction of such evidence. No abuse of discretion by
the trial court occurred that would warrant review.
Second, the trial court appropriately calculated alimony based on Buck's
estimated income at the time of the parties' separation rather than at the time of trial.
The lower court's calculation of Buck's income was in line with Utah law which gives
trial court broad discretion in selecting a method to assess a spouse's income.
Additionally, the trial court's valuation of the martial estate was also proper and should
not be disturbed.
Third, this Court cannot and should not address the Pleasant Grove property
interest issue because Cindy failed to raise and preserve this issue below and because
Cindy failed to marshal the evidence on this issue in her appellate brief. Additionally,
the trial court correctly found that Buck's interest in the property had been terminated
prior to the time of trial. Thus, it was entirely appropriate for the trial court to
determine whether or not Buck had any interest in the Pleasant Grove property.
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Fourth, this Court should not second-guess the trial court's painstaking
distribution of martial assets. Asset distribution is intensely factual. However, Cindy
has failed to marshal the evidence, as required by Utah law.
Fifth, since Cindy's brief does not comply with Utah appellate procedure, this
Court should not entertain Cindy's argument regarding attorney fees. Cindy herself
represented that the issue of attorney fees should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous
standard; however, Cindy failed to marshal the evidence in her brief. Additionally,
Cindy failed to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the court's findings and also failed to
demonstrate how Buck mislead the trial court.
Sixth, although both parties argue that the trial court should not have interpreted
its Ruling regarding BASCO sua sponte at the January 18, 2007 hearing, if this Court
finds that the trial court did not err, BASCO should be valued at the time of the
divorce, not at the time of the trial. Otherwise, if this Court were to value BASCO at
the time of the trial, it would be effectively redistributing assets between the parties and
allowing Cindy two bites at the same apple - to have the interest that accrued since
September 2003 as well as any appreciation on BASCO between the September 2003
separation and the March 2006 trial. Such a windfall would be both unwarranted and
unfair.
APPELLEE'S BRIEF
I.

CINDY FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE
TRIAL COURT FINDINGS WHICH SHE CHALLENGES
16

Cindy has failed to marshal the required evidence for many of the trial court's
findings that she is appealing. If the evidence is inadequately marshaled, this court
assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence." Chen v. Stewart,
2004 UT 82, 119, 100 P.3d 1177, 1184. Cindy cannot escape the duty to marshal
simply by characterizing this issue as a legal issue: "Even where the [appellants]
purport to challenge only the legal ruling, ... if a determination of the correctness of a
court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact sensitive, the [appellants] also
have a duty to marshal the evidence." Id.
A.

Alimony

Cindy challenges the trial court's findings regarding alimony, specifically
regarding the calculation of Buck's income and the refusal to consider Buck's alleged
fault. However, Cindy failed to set forth all the evidence in support of the trial court's
alimony award. The trial court provided a detailed description of its alimony
calculations and property distributions, including its reasons for using the date of
separation for valuation, rather than the date of the trial. (R. at 2926.) Thus, the trial
court considered extensive information regarding Buck's income level and the parties'
assets.
Rather than marshal the evidence, Cindy cites isolated facts in support of her
argument that the trial court somehow turned a blind eye to certain transactions. Cindy
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clearly does not present an unbiased view of the evidence that was before the trial
court, nor does she give an accurate representation of the court's ruling.
Further, Cindy claims the trial court was allegedly biased against her in the
alimony award. Without marshaling the evidence, she attempts to use "judicial bias" as
a vehicle to allow the Court to revisit the trial court's calculation of alimony. Cindy,
who relies largely upon allegations of judicial unfairness, does not present any
additional, solid evidence showing an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this Court
should not disturb the lower court's finding regarding alimony calculations.
B.

Pleasant Grove Property

In addition, Cindy failed to marshal the required findings of the trial court
regarding the Pleasant Grove Property. The trial court carefully listened to and
analyzed testimony from several witnesses and made factual findings upon which it
based its ruling that neither party had any interest in the Pleasant Grove property. (R.
at 2944-2945.) Each of these findings were incorporated into the trial court's
conclusions that Buck's interest in the property had been forfeited and consequently,
neither Buck nor Cindy had any interest in the property.
Cindy purports to challenge the trial court's legal ruling that it exceeded its
jurisdictional authority to adjudicate claims between non-parties. However, instead of
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challenging that ruling on a review of the law1, Cindy resorts to a discussion of the
selective facts and extrinsic evidence to support her argument.
As demonstrated by Cindy's recitation of facts relating to the Pleasant Grove
property issue, Cindy's entire argument regarding this issue consists of a presentation
of selective facts which the court in fact heard and evaluated regarding the disposition
of the Pleasant Grove property. The mere recitation of selective extrinsic facts in
support of argument does not fulfill a party's marshaling burden. Far from presenting
an unbiased recitation of all the evidence on which the trial court based its finding,
Cindy's Brief does not analyze the evidence in a light most favorable to Buck. Indeed,
Cindy ignores key evidence in the record, key findings of fact made by the trial court,
and fails completely to examine the testimony and documentary exhibits admitted in
support of the trial court's findings.
Accordingly, this Court should hold that Cindy has mischaracterized the nature
of her challenge and that, in fact, she is challenging the trial court's factual findings.
As such, Cindy has a duty to marshal the evidence, which she has failed to do.
C.

Distribution of Marital Property

Cindy also challenges the trial court's findings regarding the division of marital
assets. However, Cindy has not marshaled the evidence but rather picks and chooses
various statements from the trial supporting her position that Buck somehow

1

Appellee/Cross Appellant also asserts that Cindy never raised her jurisdictional issue at trial and has therefore
failed to preserve the issue for appeal and thus waived any right to raise the issue now. See Section IV.
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unilaterally diminished the value of the marital estate. (Brief at 38-41.) Such selfserving citation to the record is woefully inadequate to meet her marshaling burden in
light of the fact that the trial court made very detailed factual findings regarding the
assets and the distribution and division of such. (R. 2950). Naranjo at 1146.
Therefore, as Cindy has failed to marshal the required evidence to demonstrate
that the trial court's detailed and accurate findings were allegedly wrong, this Court
may not consider her challenge to the distribution of marital property on appeal.
II.

THE ALLEGATION OF JUDICIAL BIAS IS MOOT AND UNFOUNDED;
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DISALLOWED CINDY'S FAULT
EVIDENCE AND AWARDED HER SUFFICIENT ALIMONY
A.

The Allegation of Judicial Bias is Moot

Pursuant to Utah law, the issue of judicial bias is moot and cannot be considered
by this Court since Cindy failed to raise this issue below.
This Court has specifically asserted "that matters not put in issue before the trial
court may not be raised for the first time on appeal." Wade v. Stangl, 869 P.2d 9, 11
(Utah App. 1994) (internal references omitted). See also Straley v. Halliday, 997 P.2d
338, 340-341 (Utah App. 2000).
Further, in order to preserve the issue of judicial bias for appeal, a party must
first file an affidavit in trial court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b). See
Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 926-927 (Utah App. 1992). Under Rule 63(b)(1)(A), a
party's motion to disqualify a judge "shall be . . . supported by an affidavit stating facts
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sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest." This motion shall be filed no
later than 20 days after the assignment of the action to the judge, the appearance of the
party, or "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based." Utah
R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B).
Alternatively, Cindy should have filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or
amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah R.
Civ. P. 59(a)(1). Accordingly, by failing to file the appropriate motion and affidavit
with the trial court or by failing to file a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend
judgment, Cindy did not properly preserve the issue of bias for appeal.
B.

The Trial Court was Not Biased Against Cindy

Assuming arguendo, that Cindy's bias argument is not moot, the trial court's
commentary, statements of fact and its decision to disallow evidence of Buck's alleged
fault in the divorce simply does not rise to the level of judicial bias or prejudice.
i.

The Trial Court's Comments Were Fair

The comments made by the trial court were fair and did not rise to the level of
judicial bias. In Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. Debry, 38 P.3d 984, 992 (Utah App.
2001), this Court followed the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Liteky
v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), which held that,
[Ojpinions formed by the judge...do not constitute a basis for a bias or
partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
21

antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial
remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or
even hostile to...the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a
bias or partiality challenge.
Id. at 555. Thus, u[m]ere 'expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction,
annoyance, and even anger," are insufficient to establish the existence of bias or
partiality." Campbell, Maack & Sessions, 38 P.3d at 992 (citations omitted).
Since the trial court stands at the center of fact-finding and the assessment of
witness reliability, the Second Circuit declared, "If the judge did not form judgments of
the actors in those court-house dramas called trials} he could never render decisions."
Id., citing In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F. 2d 650, 653-654 (2d Cir. 1943) (emphasis
added). Further, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that an alleged bias must "be grounded
on more than conjecture and speculation." Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan,
767 P.2d 538, 544 n. 5 (Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court has additionally noted
that if, "[t]he traditional view is that if a judge can be disqualified for bias following a
comment or ruling during the court proceedings, there is no limit to disqualification
motions and there would be a return to 'judge shopping.'" IcL, quoting L. Abramson,
Judicial Disqualification Under Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct 23 (1986).
In an attempt to bolster her alleged judicial bias argument, Cindy cites four
comments made by the trial court judge. Each comment is unbiased and falls
within the realms of permissive judicial remarks. For example, the trial judge
stated he "was offended by Cindy's morals" at the cohabitation hearing and that
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this offense influenced "his ultimate award of alimony to her." Brief at 25.
However, these comments were merely critical of Cindy and disapproving of her
morals, but such is insufficient to establish bias. See Campbell, Maack &
Sessions, 38 P.3d at 992. The same argument applies to each comment cited by
Cindy and thus, the trial judge was not biased against Cindy.
ii.

The Trial Court Correctly Refused Evidence of Buck's Alleged
Fault

Cindy also improperly asserts that the trial court was allegedly biased against her
because it refused to receive evidence of Buck's supposed fault. Contrary to Cindy's
argument, Utah Code § 30-3-5(8)(b) states that "[t]he court may consider the fault of
the parties in determining alimony." The statute does not require the trial court to
consider fault, nor does the statute mandate that if fault of one party is admitted, fault
of the other party must then follow.
A review of the record clearly indicates that the trial court refused to hear
evidence on Buck's alleged abuse—not because the court was biased against Cindy, but
because the issue of fault was not before the court at that time. After Cindy's counsel
pursued questions related to abuse during his direct examination of Cindy, the trial
court asserted that abuse was not an issue before the court and that the "grounds for
divorce are long since behind" the court proceedings. (R. at 2840, 515:2-5.) (See also
R. at 28240, 515:15-18 ("she could attack his character if it's relevant to the issues.
But whether he was abusive is not relevant to any issue before the Court today . . . .").
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It should be noted that the issue of Buck's fault was raised by Cindy's counsel at the
March 2006 trial, which focused on financial issues, not at the October 2005
cohabitation hearing.
Further, in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court
asserted:
In this matter, while [the appellant] claims to have been victimized by
Buck, the only significant evidence of fault that I have observed has been
Cindy's near cohabitation. I have not seen any other significant fault.
Thus, if I err, I err on Buck's behalf as Cindy is the one who has turned
up the flames during the period after separation and before this trial by
her open flaunting of her relationship with Mr. Bradbury while continuing
to demand alimony.
R. at 2963. Thus, the trial court specifically noted that it would not consider evidence
of Buck's alleged fault because it had not seen any significant evidence of his fault.
Interestingly, Cindy is attempting to use facts from the October 2005 cohabitation
hearing, in which she prevailed, as evidence that the trial court was somehow biased
against her.
C.

The Trial Court Awarded Sufficient Alimony within the Appropriate
Legal Standards and Properly Supported its Decision

Even if the trial court was allegedly biased against Cindy, her alimony award
was sufficient and within the appropriate legal standards. Under Utah law, the
appellate court "will not disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court
exercised its discretion within the appropriate legal standards . . . and ' "supported its
decision with adequate findings and conclusions ... ' " Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942,
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946 (Utah App. 1998) (citations omitted); see also Thomas v. Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, if
12 (Utah App. 1999). The trial court must consider the following factors in awarding
alimony, "(1) the financial needs and condition of the recipient spouse; (2) the ability of
the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for himself or herself; and (3) the
ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 80 P.3d
153, if 8 (Utah App. 2003) (citations omitted). See also Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8)(a). This Court has clearly articulated the standard: "If these factors have been
considered, '" we will not disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." ' " Childs, 967 P. 2d
at 946 (omitting citations) (emphasis added).
The trial court clearly considered the required alimony factors:
1.

"In attempting to determine an appropriate level of permanent alimony in
this case, the most persuasive evidence is the amount of alimony and
payments in the form of alimony which Buck made under the temporary
order, as moderated by the amount of debt which he had to incur to make
those payments, coupled with the income which Buck received from KBR
as reported on his tax returns." (R. at 2965-2964.)

2.

"Other than the payment of her attorney's fees, [Cindy] has been able to
meet most or all of her living expenses with this level of alimony." (R. at
2964.)

3.

Cindy is entitled, to the extent possible, to retain the standard of living
she enjoyed during the marriage, and "alimony is one vehicle to make that
happen " (Id.)

The trial court thus settled on an alimony award of $4,000 per month, which
represents 32% of Buck's gross income. (Id.) The trial court found this amount
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sufficient for Cindy to meet her expenses, noting that the amount Cindy sought ($7,500
per month), "results in a penalty to Buck and a windfall to Cindy." (R. at 2964-2963.)
It is unreasonable for appellant to argue that "it was grossly inequitable for the lower
court to force Cindy to tightly budget a living on $4,000 per month . . . ." Brief at 2728. The fact that Cindy is not happy with $48,000 per year in alimony is by no means
a legal factor meriting this Court's recalculation of the trial court's award.
Accordingly, Cindy has failed to identify any serious inequities demonstrating
the trial court's alleged bias against her or abuse of discretion. Thus, the trial court
awarded Cindy sufficient alimony within the appropriate legal standards.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CALCULATED ALIMONY
A.

For Purposes Of Alimony, The Trial Court Correctly Estimated
Buck's Income During The Years Preceding Trial

The trial court correctly calculated alimony by employing Buck's estimated
income during the years preceding trial, rather than his estimated income at the date of
the trial. "[T]rial courts have broad discretion in selecting an appropriate method of
assessing a spouse's income and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion."
Griffith v. Griffith, 985 P.2d 255, 260 (Utah 1999). See also Haumont v. Haumont,
793 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah App. 1990). Further, as stated above, this Court "will not
disturb a trial court's alimony award so long as the trial court exercised its discretion
within the appropriate legal standards . . . and ' supported its decision with adequate
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legal findings and conclusions . . . . ' " Childs, 967 P.2d at 946 (references omitted).
In addition, the Utah Code provides that:
[a]s a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing
at the time of separation, in determining alimony...However, the court
shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its
discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time
of trial.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(c) (emphasis added).
The decree of divorce was issued on September 5, 2003, with the financial issues
reserved for trial. The Amended Decree of Divorce was not issued until June 2006—
nearly three years after the divorce date. In the summer of 2006, the trial court was
faced with the challenge of awarding alimony and dividing the marital estate equitably
after the parties had been separated for several years. The trial court exercised its
discretion to find a median point to determine alimony - one that would not prejudice
nor give a windfall to either party.
Cindy ignores the fact that the trial court did not simply base alimony on Buck's
income at the time of separation. The trial court explained its calculation of Buck's
earning capacity in its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated July
27, 2006, wherein the court considered Buck's income from 2002 through 2005, not
the separation date of 2003 alone. (R. 2966.) The court concluded that Buck has the
capacity of earning $150,000 per year because "for three of the four years at issue
Buck's average annual income from KBR has been $136,000." (Id.)
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Accordingly, the trial court did not pick a sum arbitrarily, but clearly delineated
its method of determining alimony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion, nor has
Cindy put forth any reasons showing such an abuse of discretion.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Found that Buck Did Not Deplete Marital
Assets

Cindy also makes the argument that the trial court failed to take into
consideration the alleged depletion of the marital estate between the September 2003
divorce and the March 2006 trial. (Brief at 30-31.) However, Cindy misapprehends
the correct date for property division and the trial court never found any evidence that
Buck depleted marital assets.
Cindy quotes Shepard v. Shepard, 876 P.2d 429, 432-433 (Utah App. 1994) for
the rule that the martial estate is valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial and
that any deviation from this general rule should be supported by detailed findings by the
trial court. Brief at 32. However, in this case, which was a bifurcated divorce, the
parties obtained a divorce on September 5, 2003, while reserving the issues of property
division and alimony for trial. Cindy erroneously refers to the divorce date as June 21,
2006, which was actually the date of the trial court's ruling regarding property division
and alimony. See Amended Decree of Divorce, R. at 3007. The trial court itself
asserted, "[t]he case law is replete that assets generally should be valued as of the date
of the divorce decree. In this case the decree was entered in September 2003." (R. at
2926).
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Thus, Cindy incorrectly relies upon Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688
(Utah. App. 1990) for the proposition that " '[a]ny deviation from the general rule
(marital estate is valued at the time of divorce decree) must be supported by sufficiently
detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court's basis for such deviation."5 Brief at
32. Since Robinson v. Robinson was a bifurcated divorce, the trial court correctly
valuated the martial assets at the date the divorce decree was entered, September 5,
2003, rather than the date of trial. Thus, the trial court was not required to provide
detailed findings of fact regarding its choice of valuation date, since it did not deviate
from the standard date of divorce.
In addition, Cindy incorrectly alleges that "the lower court failed to acknowledge
[Buck's] additional income for the purposes of determining the appropriate amount of
alimony or in dividing martial assets." Brief at 31. The lower court's Ruling set forth
detailed descriptions of the trial court's property division and alimony calculation. (R.
at 2950.) The trial court by no means turned a blind eye to Buck's expenditures of the
martial estate prior to trial, despite Cindy's allegations of depletion.
Finally, Cindy sets forth a series of allegations, none of which accurately support
her argument. First, she asserts that Buck "admitted he took $106,373.07 from an
equity line backed on the martial home for personal use." (R. at 2839, pp. 308:5-11.)
Brief at 31. In its Amended Decree of Divorce, the trial court specifically stated that
u

[a]fter April 1, 2003, Buck incurred additional debt on the home equity loan. Buck
29

must repay all of the home equity loan debt on the home incurred after April 7, 2003."
(R. at 3002-3001, 2998.)

Second, Cindy asserts, "Buck admitted to purchasing

furniture from RC Willey during the separation for his new home." Brief at 31
(citations omitted). However, these purchases are not part of the marital estate, as
noted by the trial court. (R. at 3000.) Additionally, Cindy states that Buck admitted at
trial that he sold a camper trailer belonging to the parties after the separation for
$18,000. Brief at 31. But Cindy fails to state that the trial court also found that the
appellee "must be charged for that amount [$18,000] in the final financial settlement
between the parties." (Id.) It is difficult to understand how this is an example of the
trial court's turning a blind eye to the Buck's expenditures.
Cindy appears to ignore the tedious balancing by the trial court of Buck's
expenditures during the period between the divorce and the trial. Despite its thorough
investigation of Buck's income and assets, the trial court never found he dissipated
assets, nor anything close to dissipation. Accordingly, no abuse of discretion occurred
by the trial court, and thus, this Court should not overturn the lower court's decision.
IV.

CINDY HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL AND THE TRIAL
COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT BUCK HAD NO
INTEREST IN THE PLEASANT GROVE PROPERTY.
A.

The Issue of the Pleasant Grove Property may not be Heard on
Appeal Because Cindy Failed to Raise this Issue Below.

Cindy never raised the issue of the Pleasant Grove property with the trial court,
and thus it may not be raised on appeal. Utah courts generally look at three factors
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when determining whether a party properly preserved an issue for appeal: "(1) the issue
must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be specifically raised; and (3) a
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." Brookside
Mobile Home Park, LTD. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 972 (Utah 2002) as cited from
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). With respect to each
issue argued, an appellant must provide "citation to the record showing that the issue
was preserved in the trial court; or a statement of grounds for seeking review of an
issue not preserved in the trial court." U.R.A.P 24(a)(5)(A), (B).
Cindy failed to cite to the Court where (1) she timely raised the issue that the
court exceeded its jurisdictional authority by determining that Buck had no interest in
the Pleasant Grove property, (2) that the issue was specifically raised and (3) that Cindy
introduced supporting evidence or relevant legal authority supporting her position.
Further, Cindy did not cite to the record to demonstrate where this issue on appeal was
raised and preserved in the trial court. In addition, Cindy fails to provide any grounds
for reviewing this issue regardless of her failure to raise it below. Accordingly, Cindy
may not raise the Pleasant Grove property issue for the first time on appeal.
B.

Buck's Interest in the Pleasant Grove Property was Forfeited and
Extinguished

Assuming arguendo Cindy properly raised the Pleasant Grove Property issue
below, the trial court correctly determined that Buck's interest in said property was
forfeited and extinguished. In dividing marital assets the "essential criterion is whether
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a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. To
the extent that the right has so accrued it is subject to equitable distribution."
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432-433 (Utah 1982). Moreover, "for
marital assets to be distributed, the assets must be in the possession of one, or both, of
the marital parties." Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1996).
Further, if a party does not possess the assets - that is they are in the legal possession
of another individual or entity not a party to the action - then the assets are not
available for distribution as marital assets. Id.
The present matter is factually analogous to the facts in Enrody. In Enrody, the
court determined that certain assets owned by a trust which was created by the
husband's parent were in fact not owned by either the wife or the husband and as such,
the assets were not available for distribution as marital assets. Id. at 1170. It is
entirely appropriate and necessary for the trial court to determine whether or not the
parties possess the assets claimed to be marital property.
Cindy's argument and citation to case law that "[a] court may not grant relief to
a nonparty" and courts "can only make a legally binding adjudication between parties
actually joined in the action" in and of itself, is accurate. (Brief at 35). However,
Cindy has attempted to portray to this Court that the trial court somehow stepped
outside of its jurisdiction to adjudicate claims or issues between non-parties. (Brief at
35-37). That simply is not the case.
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Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that any interest Buck may have
had in the Pleasant Grove property was extinguished by his failure to pay under the
terms of the purchase contract. (R. at 2944-2943.)

The court's decision in no way

renders judgment in favor of a non-party.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DISTRIBUTING THE MARITAL ASSETS
Cindy claimed that this Court should review the trial court's division of marital

assets under a legal standard for correctness. However, because trial courts are
afforded broad discretion in divorce proceedings, appellate courts will not reverse a
trial court's distribution of marital assets absent a clear abuse of discretion. See
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). See also Naranjo v.
Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988). Further, under Finlayson v.
Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843 (Utah App. 1994), "the trial court has considerable latitude in
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a presumption
of validity." Id. at 847, citing Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146.
Further, even under the proper standard, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in the distribution of marital assets. Cindy has failed to accurately represent
the trial court's division of marital assets. Cindy has misrepresented the effect of the
"ledger" which is attached to the trial court's ruling on this matter. The trial court
painstakingly accounted for each asset and marital debt between the parties and
correctly, under the above Utah authorities, divided the assets based on the factual
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findings made after the March 2006 trial. For example, Cindy argues, albeit unclearly,
that the court erred in not taking into account various different figures relating to
Buck's income at various points in time, alleged distributions of funds from BASCO
and KBR, purchases of furniture and the valuation of the business.2 (Brief at 38-41).
However, Cindy fails to acknowledge that the trial court specifically addressed all these
issues in its detailed factual findings and rulings regarding the equitable division of the
marital estate. (R. 2950). The trial court thoroughly accounted for any diminishment
in the marital estate and applied debts and credits to the parties so as to reach an
equitable distribution consistent with the established law. (R. 2950; See also Finlayson,
supra). Additionally, the trial court specifically accounted for its finding regarding
Buck's historically fluctuating income levels when it stated:
Taken together, I conclude that for purposes of fixing alimony, Buck has
the capacity of earning not less than $150,000.00 per year. I arrive at this
conclusion because for three of the four years at issue Buck's average
annual income from KBR has been $136,000.00. There is no evidence
that the unusually large income in 2005 will be repeated and a significant
portion of that income was distributed so that Buck and his partner could
retire some of their indebtedness to KBR.
(R. 2922-2933.)
Further, the trial court's findings concerning marital assets, income potential,
alimony and the division of the marital estate reflect many factors that were taken into
consideration by the trial court. These factors included: (1) the value of the marital
" Cindy fails to acknowledge that the alleged wrongful distributions from BASCO and KBR (if they occurred at all)
and various purchases of personal property occurred after the trial court entered the divorce decree in 2003 and are
therefore irrelevant as to a discussion of distribution of marital property.
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assets, (2) credits and debts incurred by the parties, (3) payments ordered by the court
to equalize the assignment of assets, and (4) an historical analysis conducted by the
court regarding the parties' income. (R. 2919.) Curiously, Cindy fails to address any
of the trial court's multi-factored considerations reflected in its detailed findings.
Rather, and as argued above, Cindy resorts to a selective presentation of self-serving
figures in an attempt to divert this Court's attention away from the true nature of the
trial court's rulings. Thus, the trial court undertook a detailed analysis to equitably
divide the marital assets and did not abuse its discretion.
V.

THE COURT CORRECTLY DENIED CINDY AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEYS9 FEES
The trial court properly denied Cindy an award of attorneys' fees and Buck did

not mislead the trial court. Although U.C.A. § 30-3-3 permits a trial court to award
attorneys' fees in divorce proceedings, the decision to award fees and the amount
thereof rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. Shinkoskey v.
Shinkoskey, 19. P.3d 1005 (Utah App. 2001) (emphasis added).
The trial court concluded that an award of attorneys' fees was not appropriate or
warranted. Among other things, the court specifically found that neither party had the
ability to pay the attorneys' fees of the other. (R. 2915.) Such a decision to deny an
award of attorneys' fees was within the sound discretion of the trial court and should
not be disturbed absent a finding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
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However, Cindy failed to demonstrate how the trial court abused its discretion,
and instead she weakly asserts that Buck misled the trial court concerning his income.
Cindy has misconstrued and misrepresented the nature of the evidence in a random and
self-serving presentation of figures regarding Buck's income. (Brief at 42-43).
Importantly, the arguments set forth by Cindy that Buck misled the trial court
are entirely based on evidence that was before the trial court and already considered at
length. As such, it is difficult to fathom the argument that somehow the appellate Court
should now, after the fact, determine that Buck misled the trial court when the trial
court itself was aware of all the evidence and facts presented in support of Cindy's
'misleading' argument.
Assuming arguendo Buck mislead the trial court, which he vigorously opposes,
such does not provide a basis for an award of attorneys' fees. In fact, Cindy even cites
to the case of Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah App. 2003) in support of her position
that the court should have awarded her attorneys' fees. However, the Davis case stands
for the principle that when a court awards attorneys' fees in divorce proceedings, it
should be based on the receiving spouse's financial need, the payer spouse's ability to
pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Id. at 720. Davis says nothing
about an award of attorney fees based on assertions of misleading the court. Yet, the

36

trial court determined not to award fees because neither party had the ability to pay the
fees of the other and neither was entitled to such an award.3 (R. at 2915.)
Accordingly, Cindy has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its
discretion in not awarding attorney fees to either party. In addition Cindy has failed to
demonstrate that Buck misled the trial court in any way, and thus the trial court's ruling
regarding attorneys' fees should be affirmed.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
INTERPRETING ITS RULING TO VALUE BASCO AT THE TIME OF
THE DIVORCE RATHER THAN THE TIME OF TRIAL
Cindy alleges that the trial court erred in interpreting its ruling to value BASCO

at the time of divorce rather than the time of trial during the January 18, 2007 hearing.4
Again, "[i]t is well settle that this Court will not disturb the trial court's distribution of
property and award of alimony in a divorce proceeding unless a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion is shown." Dority v. Dority, 645 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1982)
(citations omitted). Under Utah law, the "trial court has considerable discretion
concerning property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a
presumption of validity." Elman v. Elman, 35 P.3d 176, f 17 (Utah App. 2002).
This Court has stated that it will not disturb a trial court's property division and
valuation unless "there cis a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
a substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the
3

In trial court also found that neither party is entitled to fees because both parties prevailed on some issues at trial
and an award of fees was unwarranted. (R. at 2915).
4
Although the trial court correctly interpreted the date for valuing BASCO, it incorrectly raised the issue of interest
on BASCO sua sponte. Buck addresses this issue in more detail in his counter-appeal.
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findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.'" Id.
Cindy alleges that the trial court's "modification" forces "Cindy to take less than
fair market value for her interest in BASCO", citing Harmon v. Harmon, 491 P.2d
231, 233 (Utah 1971) for the rule that when money is past due and reduced to
judgment, the court should be reluctant to interfere with the collection of such debt.
(Brief at 46-47.) However, the trial court did not stand in the way of Cindy's
collection of an asset she was awarded, rather, the trial court interpreted its ruling to
include the addition of interest on the BASCO principle should Buck wish to buy out
Cindy's interest. The appellant appears to confuse the application of interest with the
transfer of the principal.
Cindy is essentially asking this Court to redistribute assets between the parties.
The trial court unequivocally awarded BASCO to Cindy. (R. at 3003) ("In order to
reduce the amount of ongoing connection between Buck and Cindy hereafter, Buck's
entire interest in BASCO shall be awarded to Cindy. If either Mr. Cardin or Buck wish
a different result, they will have to find a mechanism to buy out Cindy's interest in
BASCO awarded here."). The trial court used the divorce date, September 5, 2003, as
the date of valuation for BASCO. Thus, to change that value of BASCO would be to
change the distribution of assets between the parties.
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It appears that Cindy wants two bites at the same apple: To be awarded interest
on the BASCO principal and also to realize any increase in value of BASCO between
the September 2003 valuation date and the trial date. Thus, rather than merely
appealing from the January 18, 2007 postjudgment hearing, Cindy is also appealing
from the lower court's ruling regarding the valuation of BASCO.
Should Buck wish to purchase Cindy's share of BASCO, the appropriate
purchasing price is the September 2003 valuation price of $257,875. It would be unfair
to Buck to require him to pay 2007 market value on BASCO, since this would increase
the award of martial property awarded to Cindy by the trial court, thus interfering with
the trial court's broad discretion in allocating property and awarding alimony.
Accordingly, Cindy has failed to demonstrate that the trial court's use of the
September 2003 valuation date for BASCO was an abuse of discretion. This Court
should not reexamine the trial court's division of martial property by considering the
increase in value of BASCO between the September 2003 divorce and the March 2006
trial.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellee/Cross-Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court rule in favor of the Appellee/Cross-Appellant on the above issues.
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CROSS APPELLANT'S BRIEF
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Appellee/Cross-Appellant incorporates the Determinative Provisions section as
stated prior to Appellee's brief.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Pursuant to Buck's motion to terminate alimony, did the trial court err in
finding that Cindy was not cohabitating with Harley Bradbury based solely
on the factors established by Sursa v. Sursa, 2005 UT App. 282, 1 and/or
Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 672-74 (Utah 1985), despite a direct
admission by Mr. Bradbury that he was in fact cohabitating with Cindy?
"[T]he determination of whether given circumstances constitute cohabitation...is

in reality a mixed question of fact and law..." and the appellate court is "not bound by
the conclusion reached by the trial court." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671. Further, "in
reviewing a trial court's actions in a divorce case", the appellate court is "vested with
broad equitable powers." Id. This issue was preserved for appeal because Buck
sought, but was denied, the termination of his alimony obligations based on Cindy's
suspected cohabitation with Mr. Bradbury. (R. 2842 at 221-241, 263).
II.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting the testimony of
Buck's expert business evaluator, Brad Townsend, as to the amount of
discounts to be applied in valuing Buck's business (i.e., KBR Systems, Inc.)
for lack of control and lack of marketability, where Mr. Townsend relied on
responsible studies and appropriate literature to determine the appropriate
discounted amounts.
A trial court's division and value assignment of marital property is reviewed for

a clear abuse of discretion. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App.
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1994). See also Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Also, findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(a); England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340, 342 (Utah 1997). Further, a trial court's
decision regarding the admission of expert witness testimony is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Balderas v. Starks, 138 P.3d 75, 78 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). This issue
was preserved for appeal because Buck's expert business evaluator testified during trial
about the appropriate discounted value of Buck's minority business interest based on
previous studies and literature, but the trial court chose to reject this expert testimony.
(R. at 2924-292).
III.

Whether the trial court erred by imposing interest on the BASCO principal
dating from the date of divorce decree, rather than from the date of the
ruling, when the issue of interest was not raised by either party, nor was the
issue raised in any previous pleading or previous hearing, but the issue was
only raised for the first time on the court's initiative during a hearing on a
post-trial motion.
"Whether an issue was properly before the trial court presents a question of law,

which we review for correctness." Lee v. Sanders, 55 P.3d 1127, 1129 (Utah 2002).
This issue was preserved for appeal because it was not properly before the trial court
and was only raised sua sponte by the court in a post-trial hearing on January 18, 2007.
In addition, both parties stipulated on the record that this issue could be raised on
appeal. (R. at 2841, 22:1-23:2-3).
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STATEMENT OF CASE
The Statement of the Case, Statement of Jurisdiction and Material Facts are
hereby incorporated as set forth in the sections directly preceding Appellee's Brief.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The parties divorced in September 2003, but issues such as alimony and property
division were reserved. Subsequently, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on
whether to terminate alimony based on Cindy's suspected cohabitation with Mr.
Bradbury. Although Mr. Bradbury directly admitted to cohabiting with Cindy, the trial
court found that solely under the factors set forth in Sursa and/or Haddow (which do
not include an admission) there was insufficient evidence of cohabitation. Buck asserts
that if there is a direct admission of cohabitation, the trial court need not even consider
the Sursa factors. Alternatively, if there is a direct admission, the trial court need only
balance some of the Sursa factors, not all of them, to make a finding of cohabitation.
In addition, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting the testimony of
Buck's expert business evaluator regarding the appropriate discounted values for KBR.
Although the trial court claims that Mr. Townsend allegedly picked the discounted
values without providing a meaningful basis for his values, Mr. Townsend testified at
length about how he arrived at these values, including his reliance on numerous studies
and literature. Subsequently, the trial court further abused its discretion by arbitrarily
selecting an alternative "fair" value for KBR at a two-thirds point between Mr.
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Townsend's suggested value and the book value. Interestingly, the trial court failed to
provide any meaningful basis or findings to supports its selection of an alternative
"fair" value for KBR.
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion by awarding interest on the BASCO
principal dating from the date of divorce decree, rather than from the date of the ruling,
since the issue of interest was not raised by either party, the issue was not raised in any
previous pleading or previous hearing, and the issue was raised for the first time on the
court's initiative during a hearing on a post trial motion.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Cindy was Not Cohabitating with
Mr. Bradbury by Basing Its Decision Solely on the Sursa and Haddow
Factors, Where Mr. Bradbury Directly Admitted to Cohabitating with
Cindy
Buck appeals the trial court's decision that Cindy was not cohabitating with Mr.

Bradbury based solely on the factors set forth in Sursa and Haddow where Mr.
Bradbury clearly admitted to cohabitating. However, if there is a direct admission of
cohabitation, the trial court need not consider any of the factors in Sursa or Haddow to
make a finding of cohabitation. Alternatively, the trial court need only balance the
admission with some of the factors established in Sursa and Haddow, pursuant to the
court's equitable powers, to make a finding of cohabitation. Further, if a party's
admission to cohabitation is not dispositive, establishing cohabitation would indeed be a
difficult if not impossible task.

U.C.A. § 30-3-5(10) provides that alimony "terminates upon establishment by
the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person."
In Haddow, the Utah Supreme Court sets forth two key elements for determining
whether cohabitation exists: "common residency and sexual contact evidencing a
conjugal association." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. "Common residency means the
sharing of a common abode that both parties consider their principal domicile for more
than a temporary or brief period of time." Id. Utah courts will look at various factors
to determine whether a couple is sharing a common residence, including "open access
to the residence, possession of a key, time spent at the residence, using the same
furniture, keeping clothing and toiletries at the residence, presence of vehicles, shared
living expenses, and 'otherwise livfing] as though they were husband and wife.'"
Sursa, 2005 Ut App 282 at 1, citing Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 918 (Utah Ct. App.
1995).
Here, it is undisputed that Cindy has maintained a sexual relationship with Mr.
Bradbury. (R. at 2797); (R. at 2842, 256). Thus, Buck is only appealing the trial
court's analysis under the second element - whether Cindy and Mr. Bradbury shared a
common residence.
To determine whether Cindy and Mr. Bradbury were sharing a common
residence and thus cohabitating, (and to fulfill Appellee/Cross-Appellant's duty to
marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that Cindy was not
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cohabitating) the trial court relied on the following evidence and then applied the Sursa
factors set forth above and issued findings as to each element:
1. Open access to the residence. The trial court found that Mr.
Bradbury did not have open access to Cindy's residence, but was only
allowed access as a visitor. (R. at 2797-2796); (R. at 2842, 256-257)
2. Possession of a key. The trial court found that Mr. Bradbury did not
possess a key to the residence. Although Mr. Bradbury knew where a
hidden key was located, this is not the same thing as possessing a key and
there was no evidence that Mr. Bradbury ever used the hidden key to gain
access to the residence. (R. at 2796); (R. at 2842, 257:12-18)
3. Time spent at the residence. The trial court found that there was no
compelling evidence that Mr. Bradbury spent all or even most of his time
at Cindy's residence. (R. at 2796); (R. at 2842, 258:1-13)
4. Using the same furniture, keeping clothing and toiletries at the
residence. The trial court found that Mr. Bradbury did have some shirts
in Cindy's closet. There was no evidence that Mr. Bradbury had other
clothing or toiletries there. (R. at 2796); (R. at 2842, 258-259)
5. Presence of vehicles. The trial court found that a private investigator
and other witnesses noted the presence of Mr. Bradbury's vehicle at
Cindy's residence from time to time, but the number of time noted
indicated that Mr. Bradbury was not doing anything more than visiting.
(R. at 2796-2795); (R. at 2842, 259:10-15)
6. Shared living expenses. The trial court found that there was
insufficient evidence that Mr. Bradbury paid any of Cindy's living
expenses. (R. at 2795); (R. at 2842, 259-260)
7. Living as though they were husband and wife. The trial court
found that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Bradbury
and Cindy were living as husband and wife. (R. at 2795); (R. at 2842,
260:3-10)

45

However, the trial court also found that other evidence outside of the Sursa
factors indicated cohabitation. Most significantly, on cross examination, when shown
Exhibit 15 (Freedom Elementary School records) Mr. Bradbury directly admitted that,
he was cohabitating with Cindy. (R. at 2841-A:88-89). Mr. Bradbury filled out the
school forms and attested to the fact that he and his daughter were living with Cindy.
(Id.) The trial court, upon consideration of this testimony, stated: "I think that that's a
clear admission, Mr. Thayer, that he [Mr. Bradbury] was living with her [Cindy]. (R.
at 2842: 261).
In addition to the above admission, Cindy made references to Mr. Bradbury and
herself as "we" regarding decisions on home improvements, implying that "there was
more going on here than may meet the eye". (R. at 2795); (R. at 2842, 261: 7-17)
Moreover, Mr. Bradbury's credit card purchase activity in Utah County increased
significantly after he began associating with Cindy. (R. at 2795-2794); (R. at 2842,
261)
Ultimately, the trial court found that in light of the Sursa factors, Cindy and
Mr. Bradbury did not share a common residence and thus, they were not cohabitating.
(R. at 2794); (R. at 2842, 256) Yet the trial court further elaborated that it was unsure
of how to apply Mr. Bradbury's admission of cohabitation in light of the Sursa factors,
given that a direct admission was not contemplated as one of the factors to be
considered. (R. at 2842, 260-261)
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Essentially, the trial court took the approach that only the Sursa factors should be
considered in determining whether a couple is sharing a common residence. However,
if there is a direct admission of cohabitation the trial court need not consider any of the
Sursa factors. In fact, Haddow even defines a common residence as a place where
"both parties consider their principal domicile." Haddow, 707 P.2d at 672. Mr.
Bradbury clearly considered Cindy's residence his principal domicile. Thus, the Sursa
factors should only be considered when there is a question of whether a couple is
sharing a common residence. In this case, however, Mr. Bradbury's direct admission
makes it unnecessary to analyze this case under Sursa since there is no question as to
whether the parties were sharing a common residence.
Alternatively, if there is a direct admission of cohabitation, the trial court need
only balance the admission with some of the factors established in Sursa, not all of the
factors. Further, a direct admission of cohabitation should be given more weight than
any individual factor in Sursa. Thus, Mr. Bradbury's admission, along with the
evidence found under the Sursa analysis, establishes that Cindy was cohabitating with
Mr. Bradbury.
Importantly, if this Court were to affirm the trial court's ruling that Cindy was
not cohabitating, despite the direct admission of Mr. Bradbury, such precedent would
create an almost untenable burden to demonstrate cohabitation. As such, when a trial
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court has a direct admission, such should be found to be conclusive evidence of
cohabitation for purposes of an alimony determination.
As the above evidence and testimony reflect the evidence before the trial court,
the trial court's ruling that Cindy was not cohabitating with Mr. Bradbury is clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Chen at 1184-1185. Accordingly, the trial court's
determination regarding cohabitating should be reversed.
II.

The Trial Court Erred in Rejecting the Testimony of Buck's Expert Business
Evaluator as to the Amount of Discounts to be Applied in Valuing Buck's
Business for Lack of Control and Lack of Marketability, Where the Expert
Business Evaluator Relied on Studies and Literature
The trial court erred in rejecting Buck's expert business evaluator's testimony

regarding appropriate discounted values. (R. at 2948-2947). A trial court's decision
regarding the admission of expert witness testimony is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Balderas, 138 P.3d at 78. Moreover, the "trial court-has wide discretion in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony,' and [the appeal court] 'will not
reverse unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability.'" Id. at 81, citing State
v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993).
Assuming, arguendo, the trial court correctly found that Mr. Townsend
supposedly picked the discount amounts out of the air without any meaningful basis, it
would have exceeded the "limits of reasonability" in rejecting his testimony.
However, to fulfill Appellee/Cross-Appellant's marshaling duty and to
demonstrate the trial court's error, the testimony and evidence before the trial court
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clearly demonstrated that Mr. Townsend in fact did not simply pick the discount
amounts out of the air but rather arrived at his discounted values based on "numerous
studies . . . performed over the years by thinkers in business valuation that
quantify...the reasonable range of discounts for minority interests and for lack of
marketability." (R. at 2840, 25:4-7.) The studies further demonstrated that
"[minority shareholders in closely held businesses...incur significant discounts
typically." (R. at 2840, 25:12-13.) Mr. Townsend also testified that:
[T]he studies and the literature show and the general practice in business
appraisal, is that these 50 percent interest don't suffer a complete minority
position with regard to discounts and they are a little bit easier to sell, so they
exercise some amount of control and some enhanced level of marketability over
a true minority interest, but it's not at the same level as a controlling interest.
(R. at 2840, 26:22-27:5.) Thus, Mr. Townsend concluded that, "typically, appraisal
practice is to place the discount somewhere in between a control position and a minority
position." (R. at 2840, 276-8.)
When questioned by the trial court about the discounted values, Mr. Townsend
testified that he arrived at a 27% discount in the course of his normal appraisal business
based on standards that he believed were acceptable in this industry. (R. at 2840, 27)
He also explained that the "literature indicates that the value of a 50-50 push interest is
somewhere between control and non-control positions. And in this particular case, we
calculated the value both ways, and then adjusted the discount to what it would be if the
value were at the mid-point." (R. at 2840, 81-82.)
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In fact, the trial court recognized that Mr. Townsend used his best professional
judgment to arrive at the discounted values. (R. at 2948.) The trial court even
incorporated Mr. Townsend's discounted values in arriving at its own discounted value.
(R. at 2947.)
Moreover, Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that an expert
witness may testify "in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702. Mr.
Townsend was not required to provide "underlying facts or data, unless the court
require[d] otherwise", which the trial court did not do. Utah R. Evid. 705.
As the above evidence and testimony reflect the evidence before the trial court,
the trial court's ruling that Mr. Townsend picked the discount amounts out of the air is
clearly against the weight of the evidence. Chen at 1184-1185. Thus, the trial court
abused its discretion and exceeded the "limits of reasonability" by rejecting Mr.
Townsend's testimony based on his alleged failure to apply any "meaningful basis" to
arrive at the discounted values.
Alternatively, the trial court abused its discretion by selecting an arbitrary
alternative value for KBR. A trial court's division and value assignment of marital
property is reviewed for a clear abuse of discretion. Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 433. See
also Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 263.
In reaching a value for KBR, the trial court found that Mr. Townsend's proposed
value ($944,856) represented the lowest possible figure that the court could use in
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fixing the value of the marital asset, while book value ($1,287,516) represented the
highest possible figure the court could use. (R. at 2947) Then, the trial court
arbitrarily selected a two-thirds way between these two values and declared this amount
to be a fair valuation of KBR ($1,173,296). (R. at 2946) The trial court failed to give
any basis for its selection of the two-thirds point. (R. at 2947-2946) Thus, the trial
court abused its discretion by arbitrarily picking a value for KBR without appropriate
findings to support its decision.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's value assigned to KBR
and replace it with Mr. Townsend's proposed discounted value. Alternatively, this
matter should be remanded to provide the trial court with another opportunity to review
Mr. Townsend's methods for arriving at the discounted amounts.
III.

The Trial Court Erred by Imposing Interest on the BASCO Principal Dating
from the Divorce Decree, Rather than from the Date of the Ruling, Since the
Issue of Interest was Not Raised by Either Party, the Issue was Not Raised
in Any Previous Pleading or Previous Hearing, and the Issue was Raised for
the First Time on the Court's Initiative During a Hearing on a Post-Trial
Motion
Buck appeals the trial court's award of interest on the BASCO principal. The

issue of interest was not raised in the pleadings, during trial, or by either of the parties.
In its Ruling, the trial court awarded Buck's interest in BASCO to Cindy, finding that
"[i]f either Mr. Cardin or Buck wish a different result, they will have to find a
mechanism to buy out Cindy's interest in BASCO awarded here." (R. at 2922). The
trial court later interpreted its Ruling at the post-judgment hearing held on January 18,
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2007. The trial court explained that if Buck and Mr. Cardin did not like the result of
the court's ruling as detailed above, they would need to buy out Cindy. (R. at 2841,
15:25-16:1.) The court used the September 2003 valuation to establish a buy-out price
for the BASCO interest awarded to Cindy. The trial court then asserted that interest
would be added to the September 2003 valuation price. (R. at 2841, 17:16-18)
Generally, a court may not add a new issue not raised by a party. "A trial
court's findings should fit 'within the framework of the petition as originally drawn, or
as amended' and should be supported by the evidence presented." Lee, 55 P.3d at
1129, citing In re Behm's Estate, 213 P.2d 657, 633 (Utah 1950). Thus, trial courts
may not find on issues not raised by the pleadings. Fisher v. Bylund, 93 P.2d 737, 739
(Utah 1939) ("As stated above, no such issue is raised by the pleadings. Without such
issues in the pleadings, the findings and conclusions of the lower court upon these
questions are all nullities.").
Adding an issue not before the trial court runs counter to the notions of fairness
implicit in the legal system. "Among the cardinal principles of our Anglo-American
system of justice is the notion that the legal parameters of a given dispute are framed by
the positions advanced by the adversaries, and may not be expanded sua sponte by the
trial judge." Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis, 763 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir. 1985). See also
Reddell v. Johnson, 942 P.2d 200, 202 (Okla. 1997). In Doubleday & Co. v. Curtis,
the appellate court found that the district court improperly dismissed plaintiffs
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complaint on the basis of an issue that was not properly before the court. The court
asserted that "'dismissal of Doubleday's claim based on an issue never pleaded by
[defendant] Curtis-or even implicitly raised at trial-is inconsistent with the due process ,
concerns of adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard." Doubleday & Co., 763
F.2d at 502. The trial court further noted that "such a result runs counter to the spirit
of fairness embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id.
In this case, the issue of interest was not raised by either party nor was the issue
raised in any previous pleading or previous hearing. Instead, the issue was raised for
the first time on the trial court's initiative during a hearing on a post trial motion.
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was correct in raising the issue of
interest on its own initiative, the court nonetheless erred by awarding interest on the
BASCO principal. Interest became an issue only when the trial court interpreted its
own ruling and reduced the value of BASCO to a dollar amount. However, the trial
court did not impose interest upon the other assets divided between the parties, nor did
the trial court contemplate interest on BASCO at trial or in its ruling.
The trial court did not order Buck to pay $257,875 for the interest in BASCO
awarded to Cindy. Rather, the court gave Buck the option of buying out Cindy's
portion of BASCO for $257,875, or one half of the value as of September 2003. (R. at
2841, 16:20) The payment of $257,875 would occur only if Buck wanted to buyout
Cindy's interest in BASCO, which was the interest awarded to her by the court.
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Because the trial court did not contemplate interest in its ruling, nor did it
impose interest on any other asset awarded to Cindy, it is unfair to impose interest on
the one-half share of BASCO awarded to Cindy. In effect, Buck is being penalized for
buying out Cindy's share of BASCO.
Even if interest should be applied to the BASCO principal, the trial court should
have applied post-judgment interest only, not an interest rate of possibly ten percent.
(R. at 2841, 16:20-21.) However, the court expressed uncertainty as to the proper rate
of interest: "I intended that it be paid at whatever the value was plus reasonable
interest." (R. at 2841, 18:16-17) Referring to section 15-1-1, of the Utah Code
Annotated, the court stated, "I don't think I have a basis to get into that statute that
talks about legal interest" (R. at 2841, 18:21-23) The court then stated, "[Ms.
Robinson] gets her $257,000 plus legal interest, which I think is ten percent under the
statute." (R. at 2841, 19:13-15.)
Based upon the court's statements, the court awarded "reasonable" or "legal
interest". However, the court erred in using ten percent interest as a guide. The Utah
Code differentiates between the post-judgment interest rate and the contract interest
rate. Section 15-l-4(3)(a) of the Utah Code Annotated, states, "[ejxcept as otherwise
provided by law, other civil and criminal judgments of the district court and justice
court shall bear interest at the federal post judgment interest rate as of January 1 of
each year, plus 2%." In contrast, section 15-1-1 addresses contract interest rates.
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Section 15-1-1(2) states, "[u]nless parties to a lawful contract specify a different rate of
interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or
chose in action shall be 10% per annum." Thus, interest should be imposed on the
BASCO principal, if at all, at the post-judgment rate, since this is not a contract case,
but an award pursuant to a judgment.
In addition, if interest applies at all, interest should run from the date of the
divorce ruling, not from the date of the divorce decree. It is clear that post-judgment
interest begins to accrue at the time a judgment is entered. DeBry v. Cascade
Enterprises, 935 P.2d 499, 500 n.l (Utah 1997) ("Ordinarily postjudgment interest is
imposed as of the date of entry of judgment."). In addition, it would cause a
tremendous burden on the parties if the courts were to award interest from the date of a
divorce decree in bifurcated proceedings, as opposed to the date of the ruling.
Accordingly, the trial court's erroneous imposition of interest on the BASCO
principal should be reversed. In the alternative, if interest is imposed, such interest
should be calculated at the post-judgment rate, as pursuant to U.C.A. §15-1-4, and it
should accrue upon the date of the divorce ruling, not the date of the divorce decree.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this brief, Cross-Appellant Buck Robinson respectfully
requests that this Court grant his appeal and reverse the trial court's judgments.
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